

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4802

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 7983

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E. O. 11652: (GDS)

TAGS: PFOR/ EGEN/ OCON/ JA

SUBJECT: NIXON/ TANAKA SUMMIT BACKGROUND PAPER/ II
JAPANESE OBJECTIVES

1. AT PRESENT WE HAVE NO HARD EVIDENCE OF JAPANESE PRIORITY AIMS AT THE JULY 31- AUGUST 1 SUMMIT. WE HAVE SEEN, HOWEVER, A VARIETY OF INDICATIONS OF THE OBJECTIVES PRIME MINISTER TANAKA WILL PRESUMABLY PURSUE. THIS MESSAGE THEREFORE OFFERS A PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF JAPANESE OBJECTIVES WHICH WE WILL SUPPLEMENT AND UP- DATE AS ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE BECOMES AVAILABLE.

2. PRIME MINISTER TANAKA' S APPROACH TO THE SUMMIT MEETING WILL BE MARKED BY FOUR PRIMARY CONCERNS:

A. DOMESTIC POLITICS. THE DECLINING FORTUNES OF THE LDP WILL BE A MAJOR PREOCCUPATION OF THE PRIME MINISTER. CONSEQUENTLY ONE OF TANAKA' S PRIMARY GOALS AT THE SUMMIT WILL BE TO SUPPLY THE JAPANESE ELECTORATE WITH PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE THAT HE IS AN EFFECTIVE CUSTODIAN OF JAPAN' S KEY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL ALSO WANT TO IMPRESS ON PRESIDENT NIXON THE IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT DIFFICULTIES FACING THE LDP AS THEY AFFECT THE GOJ' S ABILITY TO FIELD MAJOR REQUESTS FOR CONCESSIONS ON BILATERAL ISSUES, FOR EXAMPLE ON DEFENSE BURDEN- SHARING OR TRADE, THAT COULD FURTHER COMPOUND HIS DOMESTIC POLITICAL DILEMMAS.

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B. IMPENDING NEGOTIATIONS ON MONETARY REFORM AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND COOPERATION ON ENERGY MATTERS. PRIME MINISTER TANAKA WILL BE SEEKING TO LEARN MORE ABOUT THE PRESIDENT' S APPROACH TO PENDING TRADE AND MONETARY NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL AS

HIS VIEWS ON THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE ENERGY PROBLEM.

C. THE ATLANTIC CHARTER CONCEPT. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL WANT TO GET A FIRST- HAND READING OF WHAT MOTIVATED DR. KISSINGER'S ATLANTIC CHARTER INITIATIVE, HOW THE US ENVISIONS ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AND HOW THE PRESIDENT CONCEIVES OF JAPAN'S ROLE WITHIN THIS NEW FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATION AMONG THE ADVANCED NON- COMMUNIST INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES.

D. JAPANESE MULTIPOLAR DIPLOMACY AND FUTURE TRAVEL PLANS OF THE PRIME MINISTER. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL APPROACH HIS MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT WITH AN EYE ON HIS OWN PLANNED VISITS TO THE SOVIET UNION, WESTERN EUROPE, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA DURING THE NEXT YEAR, AS WELL AS THE CONTEMPORARY SUMMIT DIPLOMACY OF THE US. A MAJOR CONCERN WILL BE TO ASCERTAIN THE COMPATIBILITY OF US AND JAPANESE APPROACHES TO THE OTHER MAJOR POWERS AND TO MAJOR TROUBLE SPOTS, E. G. INDOCHINA, THE MIDDLE EAST.

3. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. IN MORE CONCRETE TERMS THE JAPANESE WILL PROBABLY PURSUE THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES:

A. ECONOMIC RELATIONS. THE GOJ HAS NO DESIRE TO SEE THE SUMMIT FOCUSSED ON BILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES. PRIME MINISTER TANAKA WILL WANT TO OBTAIN SOME ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, HOWEVER, OF THE STEPS THE GOJ HAS TAKEN DURING THE PAST YEAR TO REDUCE THE TRADE DEFICIT TO MORE MANAGEABLE DIMENSIONS. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL ALSO WANT TO ASSURE THE PRESIDENT OF JAPAN'S INTENT TO CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARD A MORE EVENLY BALANCED BILATERAL TRADE. THE GOJ WILL DOUBTLESS WANT TO AVOID BEING PINNED DOWN TO ANY COMMITMENT TO AN EXPLICIT TIMETABLE FOR FURTHER REDUCTION OF THE DEFICIT, AND TANAKA WOULD CERTAINLY WELCOME EVIDENCE THAT THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES THAT IN THE FUTURE THE BALANCE OF OUR TRADE AND PAYMENTS WILL DEPEND INCREASINGLY ON THE VIGOR AND RESOURCEFULNESS WITH WHICH AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES THAT NOW EXIST IN THE JAPANESE MARKET.

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WHILE ALL INDICATIONS POINT TO JAPANESE WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM IN DUE COURSE AND WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM, THE GOJ WILL PROBABLY WANT TO AVOID THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF ANY MAJOR POLICY INITIATIVE ON AID TO THE GVN AT THE SUMMIT, PARTICULARLY IF, AS SEEMS LIKELY, THEIR RELATIONS WITH HANOI REMAIN ILL- DEFINED AT THAT TIME. PARAGRAPH. BEYOND PRIME MINISTER TANAKA'S DESIRE TO HEAR THE PRESIDENT'S APPRAISAL OF FUTURE PROSPECTS IN US- SOVIET RELATIONS, HE WILL HOPE TO ASCERTAIN THE CURRENT US GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE TOWARD JOINT LNG DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN THE USSR.

B. THE ATLANTIC CHARTER CONCEPT. THUS FAR THE JAPANESE

REACTION TO THE ATLANTIC CHARTER CONCEPT HAS BEEN MARKED BY AMBIVALENCE AND CAUTION. THE INITIAL RESPONSE OF THE PRESS AND WITHIN THE BUREAUCRACY HAS TENDED TO REVEAL A GREATER INTEREST IN FERRETING OUT PRESUMED HIDDEN US MOTIVES THAN IN SHAPING THE CONCEPT TO JAPANESE AIMS. TO MOST COMMENTATORS THE POTENTIAL POLITICAL COSTS AND RISKS THIS INITIATIVE POSES FOR JAPAN APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN MORE PERCEPTIBLE THAN THE DIPLOMATIC OPPORTUNITIES IT MAY OFFER.

PARAGRAPH. WITHIN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY INITIAL REACTIONS WERE PREDICTABLY SKEPTICAL BUT CERTAINLY NOT NEGATIVE. THE INCLUSION OF JAPAN IN A CONCEPT DESCRIBED AS AN " ATLANTIC CHARTER"-- PARTICULARLY IN TERMS WHICH RAISED QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER JAPANESE PARTICIPATION WOULD BE SOLICITED FROM THE VERY OUTSET-- PRESENTED JAPANESE POLITICAL LEADERS WITH A DIFFICULT CHOICE THEY WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO AVOID; TO BE INCLUDED MIGHT MEAN BEING BOUND INTO A NEW US GLOBAL STRATEGY; TO BE EXCLUDED WOULD ENTAIL ONCE AGAIN BEING SHUT OUT OF THE INNER COUNCILS OF MAJOR INDUSTRIAL POWERS. STILL OTHERS EXPRESS SOME CONCERN THAT THE ATLANTIC CHARTER IDEA MAY TEND TO BLUR THE DISTINCTION THEY HAVE CAREFULLY CULTIVATED BETWEEN US DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS WITH EUROPE ON THE ONE HAND, AND THEIR OWN UNIQUE SECURITY TIES WITH US ON THE OTHER. THE IDEA OF LINKING SECURITY, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN FORMULATING AN APPROACH TO TRADE, MONEY, ENERGY, AND DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNS JAPANESE OFFICIALS BOTH BECAUSE OF THE INTER- MINISTERIAL BUREAUCRATIC PROBLEMS IT WOULD INVOLVE, AND BECAUSE JAPANESE OFFICIALS SENSE THAT SUCH A LINKAGE WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THEIR OWN BARGAINING

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LEVERAGE ON THE VARIOUS ISSUES.

PARAGRAPH. DESPITE THESE CONCERNS, WITHIN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WE DETECT EVIDENCE OF POSITIVE INTEREST IN THE ATLANTIC CHARTER IDEA, AND WE EXPECT THE GOJ TO BECOME MORE ARTICULATE AND MORE FORTHCOMING IN THEIR DISCUSSION OF THE IDEA AS THE SUMMIT APPROACHES.

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ACTION EA-14

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 TOKYO 7983

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CLEARLY THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IS SENSITIVE TO THE CONSEQUENCES FOR JAPAN OF BEING LEFT OUT OF A VENTURE AS POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT AS THIS FOR SHAPING THE FUTURE PATTERN OF RELATIONS AMONG THE INDUSTRIALLY ADVANCED NATIONS. MFA OFFICIALS ALSO RECOGNIZE IN THE CONCEPT A POSSIBLE MEANS OF BREAKING DOWN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS THAT HAVE INHIBITED THEIR RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE. FACED BY SOMEWHAT DIVIDED COUNSEL ON THIS ISSUE, THE PRIME MINISTER WILL WANT TO OBTAIN A FULLER EXPOSITION OF THE PRESIDENT'S THINKING ON THE AIMS OF AND MODALITIES FOR DEVELOPING THE ATLANTIC CHARTER CONCEPT, PARTICULARLY THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE CHARTER TO EXISTING COOPERATIVE INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS OEDC, GATT, ETC.; ITS RELATIONSHIP TO FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON TRADE, MONETARY REFORM, AND COOPERATION IN ASSURING A STABLE SUPPLY OF ENERGY AND RAW MATERIALS; THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE US WANTS TO DEFINE COMMON SECURITY OBJECTIVES WHICH EMBRACE JAPAN AND WESTERN EUROPE, AND PROCEDURES FOR DEFINING AND IMPLEMENTING CHARTER PRINCIPLES. A MAJOR OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO IMPRESS ON THE PRESIDENT THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF ANY ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY JAPAN WOULD BE TREATED AS A MERE APPENDAGE TO A RELATIONSHIP WORKED OUT ESSENTIALLY BETWEEN THE US AND WESTERN EUROPE.

C. SECURITY RELATIONS. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL PROBABLY WANT A SUMMIT AFFIRMATION OF OUR INTENTION TO CONSOLIDATE MILITARY BASES AND AREAS IN OKINAWA. AT THE SAME TIME THE GOJ WILL BE LOOKING FOR FUTHER INDICATIONS OF FUTURE US PLANS FOR
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FORCE DEPLOYMENTS AND STRATEGIC DESIGNS IN ASIA, AND PARTICULARLY FOR ASSURANCES THAT WE PLAN NO DRASTIC REDUCTIONS IN OUR FORCE LEVELS THAT MIGHT HAVE A DESTABILIZING IMPACT ON THE REGION. BEYOND THIS, THE JAPANESE WILL WISH TO ASCERTAIN THE MEANING OF STATEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE PRESIDENT'S 1973 FOREIGN POLICY REPORT AHT IMPLY TO MANY JAPANESE A DIMINISHED US INTEREST IN THE SECURITY TREATY AND A WILLINGNESS TO THROW IT INTO THE BALANCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXTRACTING CONCESSIONS ON TRADE ISSUES. THE JAPANESE ANTICIPATE THAT THE US WILL PROBABLY RAISE THE ISSUE OF BURDEN-SHARING IN THE DEFENSE FIELD. THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS THAT WITHIN THE BUREAUCRACY THERE IS SOME SERIOUS CANVASSING OF POSSIBILITIES. THE VIEWS OF POLITICAL LEADERS ARE LESS CLEAR, HOWEVER, AND IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT ONE OF TANAKA'S OBJECTIVES WILL BE TO ATTEMPT TO APPEAR RESPONSIVE TO US ARGUMENTS FOR SHARING OF RESPONSIBILITIES WITHOUT, HOWEVER, COMPOUNDING AN ALREADY SHAKY POLITICAL POSITION BY SSUM-

ING, OR EVEN UNDERTAKING TO CONSIDER, RESPONSIBILITIES THAT MIGHT GIVE THE OPPOSITION FURTHER AMMUNITION TO ATTACK THE SECURITY TREATY RELATIONSHIP. THIS IMPLIES THAT FOR ANY SIGNIFICANT BURDEN- SHARING TO BE POLITICALLY MANAGEABLE FOR TANAKA IT WOULD HAVE TO BE FRAMED WITHIN A LARGER CONTEXT OF ADJUSTMENTS IN THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP THAT WOULD BRING PUBLICLY DISCERNIBLE BENEFITS FOR JAPAN.

D. POLITICAL RELATIONS. THE JAPANESE HAVE BEEN LESS THAN ENTIRELY SATISFIED WITH THE REGULARITY AND CANDOR OF BRIEFINGS ON THE STATUS OF US- DRV NEGOTIATIONS ON INDOCHINA AND THE EVOLUTION OF OUR THINKING ON AID TO INDOCHINA. PRIME MINISTER TANAKA WILL PRESUMABLY WANT A FULL EXPOSITION OF THE PRESIDENT' S THINKING REGARDING THE PROSPECTS FOR STABILIZING THE INDOCHINA SITUATION. HE WILL ALSO WISH TO SECURE US UNDERSTANDING OF JAPANESE PLANS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH HANOI, AND TO IMPRESS ON THE PRESIDENT JAPAN' S DESIRE TO ADJUST ITS TIMING OV MOVES TOWARD HANOI IN A WAY WHICH DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH US EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE CEASEFIRE. NATURALLY HE WILL WANT TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE CURRENT STATE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR SINO- JAPANESE AND SINO- US RELATIONS, AND ON US AND JAPANESE RESPONSES TO DEVELOP- MENTS IN NORTH- SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS.

E. SCIENTIFIC RELATIONS. EAGER TO IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERICS
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OF US- JAPANESE RELATIONS, AND TO ENHANCE THE PRESTIGE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, GOJ OFFICIALS SEE MERIT IN SIGNING THE ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT AT THE SUMMIT MEETING; IF BUREAUCRATIC AND FACTIONAL INFIGHTING CONCERNING HIGH- LEVEL GOJ COORDINATING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES CAN BE RESOLVED. THEY MAY ALSO SEEK TO INCLUDE IN THE COMMUNIQUE SOME ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE NEED TO REVISE AND UP- DATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR SCIENTIFIC CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION, E. G. MODERNIZING OF THE US- JNR FRAMEWORK FOR SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION ON NATURAL RESOURCE QUESTIONS, AND SOME AFFIRMATION OF US WILLINGNESS TO LAUNCH JAPANESE METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITES.

F. COMMUNICATIONS. SENSITIVE TO REPEATED ASSERTIONS THAT THERE IS A COMMUNICATIONS GAP BETWEEN THE US AND JAPAN, AND THAT THE STATE OF JAPANESE STUDIES IN THE US NEEDS UP- GRADING, THE JAPANESE HOPE TO ANNOUNCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FUND FOR CHAIRS IN JAPANESE STUDIES IN SEVERAL KEY US UNIVERSITIES.
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